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The May elections for the European Parliament in European Union (EU) member countries 
marked extraordinary gains for a host 
of Eurosceptic, nationalist, far-right 
and even openly neo-Nazi parties. 
Although far-right parties are currently 
disunited and politically ineffectual 
within the European Parliament, 
they are increasingly influencing the 
national politics of EU member states 
and slowly forging alliances inside the 
European Parliament. All this is eerily 
reminiscent of the rise of fascism in the 
1930s and, arguably, it constitutes the 
most important challenge to European 
institutions and values since the club’s 
inception in the early 1950s.
With the ongoing Eurozone 
crisis in its seventh year, Europe’s 
establishment parties have been facing 
a surge in populism and extremism. 
Establishment parties that have 
governed on their own or as part of 
coalitions in the various member states 
come from a variety of ideological 
traditions (socialism, conservatism, 
liberalism, etc.) that can be placed on 
a right to left spectrum. Although these 
parties belong to diverse traditions, they 
have been converging in their policy 
choices since the 1980s, not least in 
their embrace of austerity measures 
since the beginning of the Eurozone 
crisis in 2009. In particular, the social 
democratic ideals and values that 
dominated Europe after World War 
II, which stipulated the state provision 
of universal and socially inclusive 
healthcare, education, welfare benefits 
and housing to citizens as a basic 
human right, are thought to have been 
considerably eroded in recent times.
Establishment parties coming from 
the socialist left, such as (New) Labour 
in the UK, the Social Democratic 
Party of Germany and the Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement (PASOK) in Greece 
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have been instrumental in this historic 
shift by failing to defend the inequality-
limiting achievements of the welfare 
state. Instead, establishment socialist 
parties were incorporated into a 
worldwide neoliberal trend where 
the policy focus lies on fiscal stability, 
growth through privatisation and the 
so-called ‘trickle-down effect’. In this 
scenario, convenient terms for business 
are supposed to lead to a redistribution 
of wealth through the dynamism of the 
private sector and labour market, while 
governments’ role is to keep deficits 
and debt low by cutting spending.
In the interest of this ideological 
plan, governing parties, including 
socialist ones, have promoted 
privatisation of industry and ‘flexible’ 
labour markets by, for example, the 
relaxation of employment protection 
legislation. During the Eurozone 
crisis, European governments have 
also embarked on steep and far-
reaching spending cuts (on healthcare, 
education and social security) in 
order to bring their debt levels under 
control. As a result, the post-World 
War II social contract between labour, 
capital and government, under the 
understanding that the welfare state, 
collective bargaining rights and the 
goal of full employment would be 
maintained, is threatened. The threat 
to this political and socio-economic 
consensus is, arguably, one of the root-
causes behind the menacing rise of the 
far-right in most European countries. Of 
course, these changes (marginalisation 
of labour, curtailing of the welfare 
state, etc.) have been taking place in 
the context of the tectonic shifts that 
occurred after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union as a viable economic model and 
the negative impact of an increasingly 
globalised economic system.
France is a prime example: in the 
recent French local elections, the 
nationalist and Eurosceptic Front 
National claimed the biggest victory 
in its history. The party has managed 
to give itself a PR makeover aimed at 
playing down its holocaust denialism 
and extreme anti-immigration stance 
in order to attain political credibility. 
Meanwhile, the country’s socialist 
president Francois Hollande has given 
in to pressure from the markets and 
Brussels to reduce the budget deficit 
by passing an austerity programme that 
includes social security and healthcare 
cuts. However, he has simultaneously 
limited the government’s ability to deal 
with the budget deficit by committing 
to a reduction of taxes for business in 
an apparent bid to create jobs.
This state of affairs sums up 
the reason behind the electorate’s 
bewilderment: the neoliberalism 
that has increasingly shaped policy 
in the continent has proven as adept 
at destroying the welfare state and 
social contract of societies as it has the 
idea of European solidarity amongst 
different nations or ethnic minorities 
within nations. The utter disregard 
for voters by establishment parties is 
witnessed at play in the rapid rise of 
a milieu of nationalist and far-right 
parties with worryingly xenophobic 
and misanthropic agendas that offer 
an easy way out of the political 
stalemate. It is to be expected then 
that the consensus surrounding the 
supranational institutions of the EU 
and the enshrining of anti-racism as an 
axiomatic value is stretched close to 
breaking point; such institutions were 
put in place to safeguard Europe after 
the bloodletting of two World Wars and 
the extermination of the Continent’s 
Jews in the twentieth century.
The varieties of far-right discourses 
in different member states are complex 
and include perceived threats to 
national identities from immigration 
or ethnic minorities, fascist or Nazi 
political traditions, stretching back to 
the interwar period, fundamentalist-
Christian or reactionary-conservative 
agendas and Islamophobia, which 
provides a unifying mantra for all right-
wingers much like anti-Semitism did in 
the early twentieth century.
The political establishment is 
attempting to counter the increasing 
influence of far-right parties by often 
appropriating covert versions of their 
extremist discourse. This was the case 
with the anti-multiculturalism speeches 
made by German Chancellor Angela 
Merkel and British Prime Minister David 
Cameron in a space of five months from 
each other at the beginning of the crisis. 
Both politicians argued for the stronger 
integration of immigrants into their 
respective countries’ national cultures. 
Such tip-toeing on the tightrope by 
establishment politicians has been 
called dog-whistle politics by many 
commentators, and it comprises the 
use of coded language to signal specific 
meanings to a particular segment of 
the population while communicating 
something different that can still pass 
as moderate and inoffensive for the 
majority. The practice is increasingly 
being used by both centre-right and 
centre-left establishment parties, in a 
bid to thwart the encroachment of the 
far-right.
However, anti-immigration rhetoric 
used by politicians goes against the 
opinion of mainstream economists 
and a recent report by the OECD. This 
stated that Europe will need to absorb 
fifty million migrants by 2060 if it wants 
to offset the demographic problem of 
an aging population threatening to 
shrink the tax base and bankrupt whole 
nations. Racist political rhetoric also 
does not adequately explain the facts 
on the ground as unprecedented non-
European immigration since the 1980s 
is changing the face of many cities. The 
2011 UK census, for instance, shows 
that in London less than half of the 
population is classified as white British 
with mixed-race people currently 
the fastest growing ethnic group 
and emergent new, hybrid dialects, 
like Multicultural London English, 
displacing more traditional ways of 
speaking.
It is important to get the potent 
cocktail between issues of identity 
and economic disenfranchisement 
right; otherwise, as the unsettling gains 
made by Eurosceptic parties such as 
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in France suggest, the result might be 
opportunistic and ultimately sectarian 
types of politics. Moreover, without 
principled leadership, the European 
project could come under serious 
threat. It does not follow that nationalist 
parties or sentiment are always 
regressive though. In the case of the 
referendum on Scottish independence 
from the UK, the Scottish National 
Party (SNP), which has been leading 
the devolved regional parliament and 
lost the pro-independence bid, is 
thought by some to represent a social 
democratic agenda and the kind of 
political values that were embedded in 
the post-war British welfare state of the 
late 1940s and 1950s. Furthermore, 
the SNP appears to remain committed 
to the EU, unlike other nationalist 
parties in the Continent that have 
sought to use populist rhetoric to 
capitalise on public consternation with 
the Eurozone crisis. Indeed, Sir Tom 
Devine, a leading Scottish historian and 
academic, has recently commented 
that “it is the Scots who have succeeded 
most in preserving the British idea of 
fairness and compassion in terms of 
state support and intervention.” And 
in reference to Margaret Thatcher 
who led the country, and especially 
the South East of England, down the 
path of neoliberalism “Ironically, it is 
England, since the 1980s, which has 
embarked on a separate journey.”
The example of Greece, the 
EU member state that has been 
the hardest hit by the crisis, is also 
instructive. In that country, it was the 
establishment socialist party of PASOK 
that originally asked for assistance 
with the country’s debts, leading to 
the arrival of the Troika, a tripartite 
authority comprised of the European 
Commission (EC), European Central 
Bank (ECB) and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) that is in charge of lending 
and overseeing-dictating neoliberal 
structural adjustment programmes to 
reform the Greek economy. 
The harsh austerity measures 
that have been imposed by the 
Troika with the acquiescence of the 
local establishment centre-right and 
centre-left parties have created extreme 
conditions in the country (wages 
and pensions have been halved, the 
national income has dropped by one 
quarter, poverty is on the rise and six 
in ten young people are unemployed). 
Of course, the final recipients of loans 
to Greece are mostly the country’s 
international creditors and local 
political and business elites, while 
weaker stakeholders have to endure 
years of painful cuts to pensions, 
unemployment benefits, healthcare 
and education. 
This has prompted progressive 
critics, such as the anthropologist 
Michael Herzfeld, to entertain the 
thought that the country might be in a 
(crypto)-colonial relationship with the 
West (EU, USA). In this case though, 
Golden Dawn, an openly neo-Nazi 
party with no discernible plan to 
exit the crisis other than extreme 
violence against immigrants and all 
political opponents, has been reaping 
the nationalist backlash by winning 
7% of the vote in the 2012 national 
elections and almost 10% in the 2014 
European elections. Nevertheless, 
the main opposition party to the 
coalition government, implementing 
the austerity measures demanded by 
the Troika, is SYRIZA (Coalition of 
the Radical Left), whose programme 
consists of a ‘New Deal’ or Marshall plan 
for the European South, nationalisation 
of strategically important industries 
and an international conference for 
the cancellation of the odious debt of 
countries in Southern Europe. SYRIZA 
and other left-wing parties though, 
remain the exceptions in a Europe 
where the principal beneficiaries of 
the social disaffection generated by the 
Eurozone crisis are usually right-wing, 
populist and extremist parties.
The alarming rise of the far-right 
forebodes a long uphill struggle 
for European progressive politics. 
The conditions for this are further 
exacerbated, as the latest reports 
indicate that the meagre gains in 
growth achieved over the last year 
are evaporating and Europe’s biggest 
economies, including Germany, are 
slipping back into recession. It is highly 
unlikely that a single political party or 
EU member state is going to succeed 
in standing up to the hegemony of 
austerity politics, implemented by EU 
institutions, such as the EC and the 
ECB, on its own. In the recent European 
Parliament elections it was decided 
to fight voter apathy by letting the 
parliament, which is directly elected by 
the people in each EU member state, 
have a greater say in choosing the new 
president of the EC, the EU’s executive 
branch. This was a small, albeit 
dubious, step towards democratising EU 
institutions. What’s more, the election 
somewhat diminished the dominance of 
centre-right (conservatives), centre-left 
(socialists) and liberal establishment 
parties in the parliament that have 
been proponents for neoliberal policies 
over the last decades and are now in 
accord over austerity as a remedy to the 
crisis.
The new circumstances in the 
European Parliament as well as in 
the different member states’ national 
political arenas can lead to a new 
discussion about what should be done 
differently in Europe. The building 
pressure from the far-right may force 
establishment parties to act or lead 
to future progressive coalitions in the 
European Parliament and political 
alliances between member states that 
will challenge the neoliberal consensus 
within Europe. For example, Ed 
Miliband, the leader of the Labour 
opposition in the UK parliament, 
has recently suggested that his party 
might consider re-nationalising parts 
of the railway system that have been 
mismanaged by the private sector; 
a proposition that would have been 
anathema only a few years ago. Michel 
Sapin, France’s finance minister, has 
also rebelled against the doctrine of 
austerity recently, claiming that it is 
harming his country’s recovery; while 
UK PM, David Cameron, has pledged 
to cut ‘unacceptable’ energy price hikes 
in the face of stagnant wages. Such 
statements and promises coming from 
the political establishment, though, 
may have a perfunctory function acting 
as window dressing. Moreover, it seems 
that they inspire more scepticism rather 
than trust, especially amongst Europe’s 
so-called lost generation of youth who 
have to contend with a life where they 
will be worse off than their parents in 
almost all indices. In light of this, it is 
highly unlikely that this crisis and the 
various discourses and political parties 
of bigotry and hatred that it helps 
proliferate are anywhere close to being 
finished. ■
